| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613) |
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The PEOPLE, etc., Appellant,
v.
Harold PALACIOS, Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department.
June 8, 1992.
People appealed from order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, Sherman, J., which granted motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed, 173 A.D.2d 745, 570 N.Y.S.2d 246. The Court of Appeals reversed, 79 N.Y.2d 897, 581 N.Y.S.2d 661, 590 N.E.2d 246. On remand, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that delay between indictment and arraignment was not excludable for speedy trial purposes.
Affirmed.
| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613) |
People v. Palacios
KeyCite this headnote
 110 CRIMINAL LAW
110XIV Arraignment
110k264 k. Requisites and sufficiency of arraignment.
N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,1992.
Delay between indictment and arraignment is not excludable from speedy trial calculations, as it does not prevent the People from being ready for trial. McKinney's CPL § 30.30, subd. 1(a).
| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613) |
**613
| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613, **613) |
Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Andrew Zwerling, of counsel), for appellant.
Addabbo & Greenberg, Forest Hills (Schwartz and DiBlasi, of counsel), for respondent.
**614
| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613, **614) |
Before MANGANO, P.J., and BRACKEN, EIBER and MILLER, JJ.
*595
| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, *595, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613, **614) |
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Sherman, J.), dated April 19, 1990, which granted the defendant's motion pursuant to
CPL 30.30(1)(a) to dismiss the indictment. By decision and order dated May 28, 1991, this court reversed the order appealed from, on the law, and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, denied the defendant's motion and reinstated the indictment (People v. Palacios, 173 A.D.2d 745, 570 N.Y.S.2d 246). On February 25, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of this court and remitted the matter to this court "for consideration of issues raised, but not passed upon on the appeal to that court" (People v. Palacios, 79 N.Y.2d 897, 898, 581 N.Y.S.2d 661, 590 N.E.2d 246). That consideration has now been completed.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed.
| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, *595, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613, **614) |
In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds, the Supreme Court found that 196 days were chargeable to the People. Included within the total of 196 days charged to the People were the last 22 days (i.e., March 8, 1989, through March 30, 1989) of a 36-day period between the defendant's indictment and arraignment on that indictment (i.e., February 22, 1989, through March 30, 1989). This court disagreed with the Supreme Court's determination and excluded the 22 days on the ground that " 'the court clerk, pursuant to the practice in Queens County scheduled [the defendant's] arraignment on the indictment' "
(People v. Palacios, 173 A.D.2d 745, 745-746, 570 N.Y.S.2d 246, quoting People v. Lopez, 149 A.D.2d 735, 540 N.Y.S.2d 518). In reversing this court's order determining this issue, the Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the facts of this case were indistinguishable from those of People v. Correa, 77 N.Y.2d 930, 569 N.Y.S.2d 601, 572 N.E.2d 42 and were "controlled by it" (People v. Palacios, 79 N.Y.2d 897, 899, 581 N.Y.S.2d 661, 590 N.E.2d 246). In People v. Correa, supra, 77 N.Y.2d at 931,
569 N.Y.S.2d 601, 572 N.E.2d 42, the Court of Appeals held that "[d]elays between indictment and arraignment * * * do not prevent the People from being ready for trial. Such delays are, therefore, *596
| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, *596, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613, **614) |
not excludable under CPL 30.30". Under the holding of People v. Correa (supra), it is clear that the first 14 days (i.e., February 22, 1989, through March 7, 1989) of the 36-day period between the defendant's indictment
| (Cite as: 184 A.D.2d 595, *596, 584 N.Y.S.2d 613, **614) |
and arraignment on that indictment should have also been charged to the People, bringing the total number of days chargeable to the People to 210 days, which exceeds the allowable six-calendar-month statutory limitation (in this case, 181 days), by 29 days. Accordingly, we need not address the People's alternate argument raised on their prior appeal to this court, i.e., that the Supreme Court improperly charged to the People an additional 21-day period (i.e., December 14, 1989, through January 3, 1990).
END OF DOCUMENT
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